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Abstract
International trade has been expected to reduce the gender wage gap by increasing
competition and thus reducing the rents that allow employers to discriminate. However,
some empirical assessments find an opposite effect. We provide an explanation for
the puzzling result that trade openness widens the gender wage gap under certain
circumstances.
This paper introduces employer taste discrimination in an open economy model
with imperfect competition to shed light on the heterogeneous impacts of openness on
the gender wage gap. Firms operate in an oligopoly where and prejudiced employers
can use their rents to pay men a premium, in line with Becker’s theory. Penetration of
foreign products in the domestic market triggers a surge in competition thus height-
ening incentives to reduce costs differences which reduces the wage gap. However,
an easier access to foreign markets is an opportunity for domestic firms to enhance
profits. The model determines under which conditions new export opportunities en-
able discriminatory firms to maintain their discretionary expenditures. The theoretical
predictions are confronted with data for Uruguayan manufacturing sectors that experi-
enced a sharp liberalization of trade in the 1990s. Market access of Uruguayan firms as
well as competitors’ access to the Uruguayan market, computed at the industry level,
are used for the first time to assess the impact of trade openness on the gender wage
gap in a specification inspired by the theory.
∗Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS. Email: sarra.ben-
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1 Introduction
Several theories of discrimination seek to understand why an important share of the
gender wage gap remains unexplained. Discrimination due to prejudiced employers is one
of them, though it has been somewhat overshadowed mainly because costly discrimination
is not sustainable in competitive markets, which seems inconsistent with the persistence
of the wage gap. Yet, once we acknowledge that imperfections in either the factor or the
good markets give employers some kind of monopsonistic power, we realize that costly
discriminating behaviors might not be competed away in equilibrium. This paper adopts
this approach and shows that when “competition among the few”1 prevails, taste-based
discrimination provides a coherent explanation for the heterogeneous effects of openness
on the gender wage gap.
Becker’s theory of employer discrimination suggests that, in sectors with positive rents,
the prejudice of some employers can result in a wage gap between equally productive men
and women due to unequal sharing of production revenues across workers’ groups. In such
sectors, tougher competition puts a downward pressure on the wage gap and ultimately no
wage discrimination should be observed when firms’ profits tend to zero. It follows that
trade openness should play a role in reducing the wage gap through its pro-competitive
effect. When domestic competitive forces are too weak to curb down market power, for-
eign competition contributes to drive out wage discrimination. Recent empirical evidence
shows that increase in trade openness leads to lower gender wage gaps in some cases while
in other cases it contributes to a widening of the wage gap. This paper argues that the ef-
fect of trade openness on the wage gap is more complex that the assimilation of openness to
tougher competition along with the extrapolation of Becker’s theory imply. It investigates
theoretically and empirically in which context trade openness curbs wage discrimination
and when it does not.
The standard theory of employer taste discrimination developed by Becker (1957) is at
the core of the few papers dealing with the impact of competition on wage discrimination.
Previous studies aim at isolating different competition forces to assess their impact on
discrepancies in labour market outcomes between men and women. Recent firm-level anal-
1This expression, first used by Fellner as a title to his book on oligopoly published in 1949, refers
to industries where a small number of (operating or potential) firms compete with each other. In such
environments, firms often interact strategically.
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yses prove to be consistent with implications of Becker’s model of employer discrimination.
Hellerstein and Neumark (2006) find that discrimination is observed only among plants
with high levels of product market power and profitability is positively correlated with the
share of female employees. However, over a five-year period, competitive market forces do
not significantly drive discriminatory firms out of business. Weber and Zulehner (2010) ex-
ploit Austrian firm data to investigate whether discriminatory firms are more likely to exit
the market. Firms with lower female share do have a higher exit rate, though this effect is
significant among firms with a female share below the median level only. Another strand
of the literature, more closely related to methodology of this paper, focuses on changes
at the sectoral level. Black and Strahan (2001) use deregulation of the banking sectors in
the US to isolate the competition effect. They show that the decline in rents favored more
female employees so that they caught up with their male colleagues in terms of wages and
job promotions. Other authors have been interested in the impact of trade liberalization
as it is commonly associated with a competitive shock. Black and Brainerd (2004) show
that a rise in import penetration weakens the gender wage gap in concentrated industries
in the US, as Artecona and Cunningham (2002) find for Mexican industries between 1987
and 1993. Berik et al. (2004) look at the impact of both import penetration and export
shares on the gender wage gap in the case of Korea and Taiwan. Especially noteworthy
is the finding that export shares increase the wage gap in concentrated industries. While
they conclude that foreign competition is associated with an amplification of the wage gap,
especially in imperfectly competitive sectors, thus contradicting Becker’s theory of taste-
based discrimination. This paper makes clear that this result is consistent with a setting
featuring prejudiced employers as openness is not necessary synonymous of a reduction in
profits.
Despite the attempts to appraise the pro-competitive effect of trade on unexplained
wage gaps, the underlying causal mechanisms at stake have not been investigated which
has lead to some misstatements at the time of interpreting some results. I intend to close
this gap with a theoretical proposal that clarify the conditions under which trade can
reduce wage discrimination. The theoretical insights also brings novelties to the empirical
assessment. Previous papers base the interpretation of their results on the idea that trade
openness exerts competitive pressures by confronting domestic firms with foreign firms
ignoring that it can increase domestic firms’ profit opportunities on foreign markets if they
have the competitive advantage. We show that, under specific conditions, openness of trade
partners’ markets can increase the ability to discriminate by allowing prejudiced employers
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to improve their export revenues. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one attempt to
integrate trade flows in a model of wage discrimination. Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers
(2009) use the Borjas and Ramey (1995) oligopolistic model to illustrate the impact of trade
on gender wage discrimination. Wages are negotiated according to a Nash bargaining
framework and women receive a lower share of the rents of prejudiced employers in the
concentrated sector. However, the relationship between trade and discrimination is given
by assumption. They consider that an increase in net trade always reduces the profits of
all firms, the export decision of firms is not formalized.
The first part of my contribution is to provide an explicit trade model under imperfect
competition with an endogenous determination of both trade patterns and the gender wage
gap. The model describes a single international oligopoly à la Cournot where two countries
produce and trade a homogeneous good. Firms’ output decisions and export opportunities
are determined by their relative costs of production which in turn depends on firms’ position
on the distribution of prejudice of all incumbents. This partial equilibrium model clarifies
the links between the labour market and the product market where firms use their market
power to pay different wages.
In a competitive labour market, with a large number of firms, discriminatory employers
have no effect on the wage of the minority group since its members can easily be absorbed
by the unprejudiced employers. Moreover, the wage elasticity of the labour supply faced
by an employer is infinite; if one tried to cut down women’s wages, all female employees
would leave this employer while if one tried to attract men by offering higher wages the firm
would not be able to compete anymore due to higher production costs. In a competitive
labour market, the law of one wage must apply. Here, only a fixed and small number of
firms demand labour so that the labour market is not perfectly competitive and the labour
supply is not perfectly elastic. The model features an oligopsonistic labour market where
even a small number of discriminatory employers can generate a wage gap. Oligopolists
are sensitive to the gender-composition of their workforce as in Becker (1957). Different
levels of prejudice against female workers lead to heterogeneity in firms’ unit costs. Costs
discrepancies between firms and variations in competition within the industry shape the
extent of the wage gap in each sector.
In a closed economy, a firm’s market power is determined by the number of firms;
while in the open economy, it depends also on the number of foreign firms and their
competitiveness. The impact of openness on discrimination can be derived in the model and
comes from a selection of most competitive (less discriminatory) firms into the export and
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domestic markets. Firms’ profits and the impact of trade liberalization on profits depend
on firms’ ability to compete, that is to say, on their level of unit cost. As discrimination is
costly, prejudiced employers are the ones with the poorest production opportunities. While
they can cope with their cost disadvantage in a market sheltered from competition, trade
deregulation makes it harder to maintain market shares. Under the threat of exit, previous
levels of discrimination are no longer sustainable. An easier entry of foreign products
spurs high-cost discriminatory firms to align their costs to the ones of non-discriminatory
firms; as a result, demand for male labour dwindles while that for female labour increases
which reduces the wage gap. In other words, foreign competition operating through trade
creates a selection of firms based on their human resources decision. This difference in the
ability to make the most of a market can be tracked down to the “survivor principle” of
Stigler (1958) and has been recently used in a trade model by Melitz (2003) and Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) where only the most productive firms reap the benefits of trade.
In the current model, the impact of trade openness on discrimination depends on part-
ners characteristics that shape market access and thus the trade pattern. While penetration
of foreign firms in the domestic market triggers a surge in competition, easier access to
foreign markets can be an opportunity to enhance profits. If domestic firms have a com-
petitive advantage, it is possible for them to increase their production and profit level. In
this case, trade openness results in a widening of the wag gap even in a beckerian setting.
The model is confronted with data for Uruguayan manufacturing sectors between 1983
and 2003. In the aftermath of the creation of the Mercosur in 1991, Uruguay dramatically
opened its economy to international trade. The creation of a common market took place
in two steps that generated two waves of liberalization, the first in 1991, and a second and
deeper one in 1995. I exploit these substantial changes to study the effect of two-way trade
on gender wage discrimination. I focus on imperfectly competitive sectors defined in the
empirical strategy by their higher level of concentration. As predicted by the model, sectors
where Uruguayan firms enjoy easier access to foreign markets feature an increase in the
gender wage gap while greater penetration of the Uruguayan sector by foreign competitors
exerts a downward pressure on discrimination.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section develops a model of oligopolistic
competition and wage discrimination in a closed economy. Section III provides the open
economy version to understand in which conditions openness reduces wage discrimination.
Section IV describes the empirical methodology, the data and presents the results. The
last section concludes.
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2 Oligopolistic competition and discrimination in a closed
economy
2.1 The model
Demand
Consumers have access to a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is linear and
gives the -unique- price of the product. It depends positively on the size of demand b2 and
decreases with the aggregate level of production Q in the market :
p = b−Q = b−
N∑
i=1
qi (1)
A linear demand function easily features the downward pressure on prices and mark-ups
stemming from tougher competition (more firms serving the market), and thus highlights
the effect of competition on employers’ ability to discriminate.
Production
This model consider a single oligopoly with restricted entry3. We assume that there is
an exogenous fixed number N of potential firms that can produce the same homogeneous
good. Firms, indexed by i, are ranked by their distaste for hiring women di ∈ [0; d¯] which
is exogenous and influences employers’ human resources policies. Firms are thus ex ante
heterogeneous in there preferences, and the distribution of prejudices is exogenously given.
Employer heterogeneity in d does not impact their production technology though and all
firms have access to the same technology. However, the endogenous equilibrium wage gap
d∗ ultimately determines the type of worker a firm hires along with its wage bill; the ex
post distribution of firms’ outcomes, e.g. marginal cost and production, is thus endogenous.
Labour is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied at its sector level
L¯. Male labour supply is denoted L¯m and the female labour supply is L¯f ; none of them are
influenced by the level of discrimination in this model. Firms’ technologies are identical
2We do not relate consumer demand for goods to the household wealth, workers’ wages and entrepreneurs’
profits. Not incorporating income effects is plausible as individuals working in one sector consume only a
small fraction of the good they produce so that demand is not much affected by their revenues.
3This approach is adopted in chapter 5 of Helpman and Krugman (1987); potential explanations for the
absence of free entry are stringent market regulation or deterrent start-up costs.
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and are represented by a linear production function
qi = lif + lim
where male labour lm and female labour lf are perfect substitutes.
Total costs have a simple form that features constant returns to scale once the firm is
operating in the market: C(qi) = ciqi where ci is firm i’s unit cost of production. Employers
not only take into account the wages paid to employees but also their personal distastes
for certain type. Employer i is ready to hire women if the gander wage gap overweight its
utility loss, i.e. wf + di < wm. As a consequence, firms have different perceived labour
costs
ci =
{
wf + di if firm i employs women
wm if firm i employs men
This setting leads to complete gender segregation across firm. Firms hiring men have the
same unit labour cost cm = wm while firm hiring women have different perceived labour
costs, wf + di , because of heterogeneity in their tastes.
2.2 The firm’s problem. Output decisions
Employer i maximizes a utility function equals to the profits minus the monetary value
derived from the disutility of employing women. If di > 0, employer i is prejudiced against
women and discounts his economics profits by di × lf the utility loss caused by employing
lf women. The setting is a standard one-stage game in which N firms compete in quantity.
The price p depends on the production of all incumbent firms and firm i takes the output of
other firms as given while maximizing its profits. They consider the following maximization
problem where the objective function is concave in qi:
max
qi
pii = qi
p(qi,∑
j 6=i
qj)− ci

where qj is the production level of competitor j and the unit cost ci embeds preferences.
Firms are wage-takers and choose the number of workers they hire. The first order condi-
tions for the N different firms can be written:
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qi = p− ci ∀i = 1, ..., N
Among the N firms, Nf firms hire women at a perceived cost cif = wf + di and Nm
hire men at the same cost cm = wm. There are thus Nf + 1 equations of firms’ production
levels :
qim = p− wm for “male-firms”
qif = p− (wf + di) for “female-firms”
The number of workers they hire is decreasing in their specific costs ci. Considering
how much should be produced, employer i behaves as if the true cost was wf + di, even if
the real economic cost of a firm hiring women is wf . Consequently, the first order condition
implies that employer i produces less than an employer j with dj < di. Among firms that
hire women, those with lower prejudice employ more women and produce more. Besides,
firms hiring women have lower costs and hence produce more that firms employing men.
Firms’ reaction functions
We have seen that employer’s type pins down his perceived cost which in turn determines
his choice of production scale. Substituting the value of p given by the demand function
(1) into the first order condition gives the reaction function of each firm:
qi =
1
2(b−Q−i − ci)
where Q−i =
∑
j 6=i qj is the sum of production from all firms except firm i.
Substituting Q−i in the previous equation, firm i’s production level can be written as a
function of the average cost of its competitors c˜−i and its own cost ci only:
qi =
b− ci + (N − 1)(c˜−i − ci)
N + 1 (2)
Note that since firms are heterogeneous in their unit cost, it is necessary to check
whether all of them produce in equilibrium. This involves conditions on the size of the
demand b and N the number of operating firms which is exogenously fixed. Appendix A
states the conditions that ensure an interior solution.
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We can use equations (1) and (2) to give another expression for the price of the homo-
geneous good:
p = N
N + 1
(
b
N
+ C(Q,N)
N
)
where C(Q,N) = ∑Ni ci is the sum of production costs of all operating firms. This
expression captures the pro-competitive effect of market size N that plays through a market
fragmentation effect and the reduction in the average unit cost of competitors. An increase
in N reduces the price and as a consequence the mark-ups firms can enjoy. The price is
also positively related to the demand size bN ; this explains why firms thrive on penetrating
new markets.
2.3 The marginal discriminator
We now dwell on labour cost discrepancies across firms and relate male and female
wages. We need to determine Nf the number of firms that employ women (Nm the number
of firms that employ men is simply N−Nf ). There is a continuum of prejudice degrees (d ∈
R+). In order to simplify some of the ensuing analysis, we use a specific parametrization
for its distribution among employers. In particular, let us assume that the actual prejudice
of incumbents has a discrete uniform distribution over the interval [0; d¯]. The difference
in prejudice between two firms is di − di+1 = d¯N−1 . The equilibrium wage gap will be
determined by the level of prejudice of the last firm hiring women Nf -called the marginal
firm. Nf is the only firm to be indifferent between employing men and employing women.
In equilibrium,
wf + d∗ = wm with d∗ ∈ [dNf ; dNf+1 [ (3)
There is a continuum of equilibrium gender wage gaps comprised between the preju-
dice of the marginal employer dNf and the prejudice of the next firm dNf+1 . Under the
assumption of discrete uniform distribution of d, we can express d∗ as:
d∗ = (Nf − 1) d¯
N − 1 + ν with ν ∈ [0 ;
d¯
N − 1[
Note that this general case d∗ = dNf + ν can be reasonably reduced to d∗ = dNf + 
as all the employers i with di > dNf can hire men by setting a wage just above the one
that makes the previous employer indifferent between men and women. Without loss of
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generality, we can thus express the wage gap as:
d∗ = (Nf − 1) d¯
N − 1 (4)
We can now express employers’ perceived costs in this way:
ci =
{
wm − (d∗ − di) if di ≤ d∗ so that firm i employs women
wm if di > d∗ so that firm i employs men
There is a complete segregation of men and women across firms if d∗ = dNf + , the
marginal firm being pivotal. It is possible that the marginal firm has a mixed labour force.
In that case, the wage gap is exactly equal to the monetary equivalent of its prejudice level
d∗ = dNf , and the marginal employer is indifferent between hiring women or men. The
exact gender composition of its labour force depends on the female and male labour supply
as well as on the distribution of production levels across firms. We will consider the case
where the Nf firms completely absorbed the female labour supply so that there is no mixed
firm. This hypothesis does not alter the results of the model and facilitates the resolution
of the labour market clearing conditions.
2.4 The labour market equilibrium
Wages of both men and women adjust until full employment is reached. The demand
for female labour is given by the total production level of the female firms. Using the first
order condition, the labour market clearing conditions can be written:
L¯f =
Nf∑
1
p− (wf + di) and L¯m =
N∑
Nf+1
p− wm
The sum of the monetary equivalent of the utility loss di faced by discriminatory em-
ployers who hire women is, under the assumption that the distribution of d follows a discrete
uniform over [0; d¯], an arithmetic series:∑Nf
1 di = d1 + d2...+ dNf = 0 + d¯N−1 + 2
d¯
N−1 + ...+ (Nf − 1) d¯N−1 .
Nf∑
i=1
di =
Nf (Nf − 1)
N − 1
d¯
2 (5)
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Using equation (5), the labour market clearing conditions can be written:
L¯f = Nf (p− wm) +Nf (Nf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2) and L¯m = Nm(p− wm)
This yields the equilibrium wages wf and wm:
wf = p− Nf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2 −
L¯f
Nf
(6)
wm = p− L¯m
Nm
(7)
From the two wage equations, we can easily find the expression for the gender wage
gap d∗ = wm − wf :
d∗ = L¯f
Nf
− L¯m
Nm
+ Nf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2
Having previously defined d∗ as a function ofNf in equation (4), we can define implicitly
d∗:
d∗ = 2d¯
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
(8)
Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of d∗ are developed in the appendix.
Let us recapitulate the equations that define the equilibrium of the economy:
wf = p− Nf−1N−1 d¯2 −
L¯f
Nf
wm = p− L¯mNm
d∗ = wm − wf
Nf = 1 + d
∗
d¯
(N − 1)
p = NN+1
(
b+ wm − NfN
(
Nf−1
N−1
d¯
2
))
qim = p− wm
qif = p− (wf + di)
The first two equations give the wages of women and men as a function of the price, the
total number of firms in the sector and the number of firms that hire women while the third
equation defines the wage gap. The fourth equation gives the expression for the number
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of firms employing women which depends on the distribution of prejudice across the firms
d¯
N−1 and the wage gap. The price is determined by the size of the demand and the average
of firms’ unit costs as given by the fifth equation. The last two equations define firms’
output levels that depend on their perceived unit costs. Firms employing women make
heterogeneous output decisions depending on their d while firms employing men produce
the same amount as they have the same perceived cost of production wm.
Evolution of the wage gap
We can derive standard predictions of the beckerian model by applying the theorem of
implicit functions on Φ
Φ ≡ d∗ − 2d¯
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
= 0
First, for a given number of firms, the wage gap expands if more women enter the labour
market, ∂d∗
∂L¯f
> 0 . More firms hire women so that the marginal employer has stronger
prejudice and requires a wider wage differential between male and female employees. As
expected, the opposite holds when it is the male labour supply that goes up, ∂d∗
∂L¯m
< 0.
Moreover, it follows that d∗ decreases with N , ∂d∗∂N < 0. Suppose the range of prejudice
does not widen (d¯ remains unchanged), if the total number of firms increases, the number
of firms managed by employers with a level of prejudice lower than d∗ increases as well. As
a result, the marginal discriminator, the last one to employ female workers, is an employer
less prejudiced against women. This effect highlights the role of a high number of firms4
in reducing the incidence of taste-based discrimination.
Selection effect
Another way of formalizing the effect of market structure on employers’ ability to discrim-
inate is to compute the cost threshold above which discriminatory firms cannot produce.
Let c¯ be the maximal unit cost above which a firm stops producing. The solution of a
zero-operating profit condition c¯ = p(c¯) defines the cost cut-off as follows:
c¯ = b−
(
V 2
d¯
(N − 1) + V
)
(9)
4This result holds true if
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where V =
dNf
2 is the average perceived-costs difference between female firms and male
firms. In other words, V is the perceived cost disadvantage of discriminatory firms. Tougher
competition, in the sense of more firms producing, reduces the cost threshold above which
no firms can produce: ∂c¯∂N < 0
The reduction in the cost threshold slows down with the number of producers ∂2c¯
∂N2 < 0,
which means that the pro-competitive effect is more pronounced when N is small.
Furthermore, we are able to derive the implication of the spread in prejudice on the com-
petition effect. The derivative ∂2c¯
∂N∂d¯
> 0 shows that the downward impact of an increase in
N on the wage gap is stronger when the dispersion of prejudice is wider. The “disciplinary
effect” of competition is more pronounced in sectors with strong stereotypes against women.
Survival of discriminatory firms
Note that the absence of a wage gap does not necessarily mean that prejudiced employers
have exited the market. When women supplying labour are hired by unprejudiced employ-
ers with d = 0, prejudiced employers with d > 0 can employ men without having to pay
them a premium. Thus, they can stay in the market even if competition is fierce following
the entry of unprejudiced entrepreneurs. Such a situation exists when the female labour
supply is low or when unprejudiced employers are numerous enough.
3 The Open Economy
3.1 Import penetration, export opportunities and discrimination
We now consider the open economy case where two countries,D and F (for domestic and
foreign country respectively) trade a homogeneous good under oligopolistic competition.
They do have incentives to engage in intra-industry trade to capture some of the rents
that exist in the foreign market. Brander (1981) first formalized how strategic interactions
among Cournot oligopolists from two countries lead to intra-industry trade5. Country
characteristics can differ. Domestic and foreign consumers’ inverse demand functions are
respectively
pD = bD −QD (1a-T)
pF = bF −QF (1b-T)
5This type of model has been subsequently used and developed by Combes et al. (1997) Neary (2002)
and Neary (2003) among others.
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As for the product market, there are NF foreign firms which are assumed to be homo-
geneous so that all firms in F produce with the same unit cost cF 6.
Markets are segmented although domestic firms can export to the foreign market incurring
a transport cost. Foreign firms have to pay τD to sell in market D while domestic firms
D have to pay τF to export to market F , but they do not incur any fixed exporting cost.
As firms produce under constant returns to scale, they maximize separately their profits
-adjusted for their preferences- made on the domestic and foreign markets7.
When domestic firms maximize their profits from exports to F , piDF , they take into
account the production of other domestic firms that export qDF , the production of foreign
firms qF . To sell one unit in the foreign market F , they need to produce τF units, with
τF > 1.
MaxpiiDF = qiDF (pF (qDF , qF )− ciτF )
where qiDF is the sales of the domestic firms i in market F . The optimal sales level in
market F for firm i is given by:
pF + qip′F (qi, qj) ≤ ciτF
Production for each market is then8:
{
qiDD = pD − (wf − di)
qiDF = pF − (wf + di)τF
if di ≤ d∗
{
qiDD = pD − (wf + d∗)
qiDF = pF − (wf + d∗)τF
if di > d∗
6We abstract from heterogeneity in costs among foreign firms, and in particular from differences due to
discrimination; this assumption does not present implications for the determinants of the wage gap in the
domestic country as what really matters for discriminators to be able to sell is the final equilibrium price
in the markets.
7If marginal costs depended on output levels, export possibilities would influence domestic production
level and the separability in firms’ production strategies would not hold anymore
8If the transport cost is additive, the first order conditions are: qiDF = pF − wif − di − τF and qiDF =
pF − wif − d∗ − τF . However iceberg costs are more convenient and were used by Brander (1981).
14
Levels of domestic sales and exports depend on the type i of the firm:
qiDD =
b− ciDD + (ND +NDf − 1)(c˜−iD − ciDD)
ND +NDf + 1
(2a-T)
qiDF =
bF − ciDF τF + (ND +NDf − 1)(c˜−iF − ciDF τF )
ND +NDf + 1
(2b-T)
with c˜−ih the average unit cost of both domestic and foreign competitors selling in market
h. The conditions to have positive production levels in both markets for firm i, i ∈ [0; d¯],
are derived in appendix B.
3.2 The labour market
The wage gap is defined as under autarky by equations (3) and (4). The labour market
clearing conditions for female and male labour in the opened economy case, using equation
(5) to substitute for ∑i di, are given by:
L¯f =
d∗∑
i=0
qiDD + qiDF = NDf (pD + pF −
(
wm − NDf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2
)
(1 + τF ))
L¯m =
d¯∑
i=d∗+r
qiDD + qiDF = NDm(pD + pF − wm(1 + τF ))
where NDf is the number of domestic firms that employ women and NDm is the number
of domestic firms that employ men. We can then derive the equilibrium wages and wage
gap under trade:
wf =
1
1 + τF
(pD + pF − L¯f
NDf
) (6-T)
wm =
1
1 + τF
(pD + pF − L¯m
NDm
) (7-T)
d∗ = 2d¯1 + τF
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
(8-T)
Proofs of the existence and the uniqueness of d∗ are provided in the appendix.
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Let us define ΦT as:
ΦT ≡ d∗ − 2d¯1 + τF
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
= 0
which is equivalent to the function Φ above but for the trade regime.
Simple comparative statics shows that:
∂d∗
∂τF
= −
∂ΦT
∂τF
∂ΦT
∂d∗
< 0
With trade liberalization and the fall in export barriers τF , the wage gap in the domes-
tic labour market increases because discriminatory (higher cost) firms benefit from new
sales opportunities which increases their ability to discriminate. This finding, in line with
Becker’s model implication on profit opportunities and ability to discriminate, had not
been highlighted before. In previous studies, export shares are though of as another proxy
for foreign competition taking place in foreign markets. Yet, increases in competitive pres-
sures and lower profits do not necessarily come along with trade openness as openness also
facilitates the access to foreign markets.
Trade costs to penetrate the domestic market τD have no effect on the wage gap when
the number of operating firms is unchanged. In the next subsection, we will look at the
impact of trade costs τD when higher cost firms may cease production but keeping the
number of potential firms constant.
3.3 Competition and Firm Selection
To further understand how competition affects wage discrimination, let us use the cost
threshold above which a firm cannot sell in a market. We consider a situation where foreign
producer have homogeneous unit cost cF and where discriminatory firms produce positive
amounts in the domestic markets9. In the open economy framework, firms face different
zero profit conditions depending on the market they operate in. Those conditions define
the maximum level of factor prices a firm can afford in each market. Equation (9a-T)
establishes the production cost threshold to sell in the domestic market while equation
9If discriminatory firms do not operate, there is no pay gap between men and women which is of low
interest for the present study. The conditions for discriminatory firms to survive while paying higher wages
to male employees are derived in the appendix
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(9b-T) gives the cost threshold to export to market F .
The degree of competition at home
Let c¯D denotes the cost threshold above which a domestic firm cannot break even in its
domestic market. The lower c¯D, the tougher the competition in market D, the lower the
profits and the gender wage gap. This cost-threshold is equal to the selling price c¯D = pD.
c¯D =
b−NDfV +NDfcF τD
NDf + 1
(9a-T)
where V is again the average cost disadvantage of male firms compare to all female
firms.
The impact of a fall in trade cost τD puts forward the competitive effect of openness.
∂c¯D
∂τD
> 0 when a country reduces its trade barriers, the domestic cost cut-off diminishes ;
this is due to two different effects. First, foreign firms bear lower trade costs so that the
average cost of competitors falls. Second, as foreign firms sell at lower cost they are able
to sell more: it generates a fragmentation effect.
The cost cut-off decreases also with the number of foreign firms exporting to the do-
mestic market ∂c¯D∂N < 0. This effect operates through the two channels cited above: the
fragmentation effect as more firms sell in market D and an indirect effect as an increase in
incumbent firms exerts a downward pressure on the average cost.
Lastly, ∂c¯D∂cF > 0 it is obvious that competition is fiercer when foreign competitors are
more productive, i.e. when cF is low.
The degree of competition abroad
c¯DF denotes the cost threshold above which a domestic firm does not export to the
foreign market F . Firms cannot compete in market F if their production costs multiplied
by the iceberg trade costs τF are greater than the price in market F : c¯DF = pF . The price
in F depends on the number of potential exporters ND and local producers NF , it depends
also on the production costs cF of local producers, cfDF for exporters hiring female workers
and c¯DF for exporters hiring male workers that have the highest production cost.
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c¯DF =
bF −NDfV τF +NF cF
ND(1− τF ) +NF + 1 (9b-T)
The higher the number of domestic and foreign firms, the lower the cost cut-off ∂c¯DF∂NF <
0. The lower the unit-cost of foreign firms, the lower the cost threshold ∂c¯DF∂cF > 0. Hence,
for high enough NF and/or cF , high-cost domestic firms employing men will not be able
to export.
As for changes in trade barriers τF , it has counter-acting effects on the cost cut off as
it influences firms’ sells differently on the intensive and extensive margins.
∂c¯DF
∂τF
= ND(bF +NF cF )− (ND +NF + 1)(NDfV )
The first term shows that a fall in export costs puts a downward pressure on the critical
level of unit cost (τF and c¯DF are positively correlated). For all exporting firms, it is now
less expensive to sell in F ; as a result of firms’ strategic interactions, the price decreases
and so does the cost threshold. This displays the effect of a fall in trade costs through the
intensive margin channel.
On the other hand, a fall in τF has a positive effect on the cost-threshold through the
extensive margin channel. As lower trade costs make it easier for firms to break even in
the foreign market, new less productive firms are now able to export. The entry of less
productive firms is associated with a higher cost threshold. This effect, formalized by the
second term of the derivative, is proportional to the cost disadvantage of discriminatory
firms V . When transport costs are reduced, their cost disadvantage hinders less their ex-
port opportunities which enable them to pay higher wages. The second effect dominates
when the cost discrepancies between discriminatory and non-discriminatory firms is high,
which corresponds to an industry with a small number of firms.
This is a particularly interesting result as it puts emphasis on an "anti-competitive"
effect of openness that has not been though of in previous empirical analysis. Moreover, it
sheds lights on the conditions under which this effect dominates. When a market is heavily
concentrated, the extensive margin effect dominates and the wage gap widens. However, as
the number of firms increases, the extensive margin effect is compensated by the intensive
margin effect. The latter being pro-competitive, in sectors with a high enough number of
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firms, trade liberalization in partner countries decreases the wage gap.
To sum up, profit opportunities can increase with trade. When partners’ trade costs
fall and when the number of foreign competitors is low, exports opportunities expand,
which benefits both non-discriminatory and discriminatory firms. Exports are also higher
if domestic firms have a significant cost advantage cD < cF .
On the other side, profit opportunities can dwindle with trade if domestic firms have not
the competitive advantage. Foreign competitors NF producing at lower costs, paying low
trade costs τD, put a competitive pressure on domestic firms and make it harder for dis-
criminatory firms to produce. In this case, trade will favor the low-cost non-discriminatory
firms over discriminatory ones. Discriminatory firms will have to cease production, lower-
ing the demand for male labour. Hence the wage gap will go down until full employment
is restored.
3.4 Link with market access
This model shows that trade liberalization can have differential effects on the gender
wage gap as it depends on the competitive advantage of domestic firms (determined by
cD, ND, cF , NF ) along with the trade costs (τD and τF ). We have seen that the maximum
labour cost a firm can incur depends on its ability to make profit at home and abroad. This
brings to light a close connection with market potential as defined in economic geography
models. New Economic Geography (NEG) models formalize a causal relationship between
wages and market potential as the latter determines the level of profit that can be shared
with employees. What is called the “NEG wage equation”, first presented by Fujita et al.
(1999), indicates that the wages that can be paid by a firm located in region r depend on the
market access of this region MAr which is a function of trade costs to penetrate foreign
markets and the level of competition in those markets. These models typically feature
competitive labour market and free entry of firms. In this paper, although the labour
market is not competitive and the firms entry is restricted, market potentials influence
firms’ profits in the same way as in standard economic geography models.
The model hence has novel empirical implications as the size of the wage gap does not
depend primarily on trade volumes but rather on market potentials. Both domestic firms’
accesses to foreign markets and foreign firms’ accesses to the domestic market are used for
the first time to capture the pro-competitive effect of trade and geography. This model
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further helps to understand how wage gaps respond to evolutions of the market access
depending on the domestic market structures: an improvement in the access to foreign
markets increases the wage gap when only a few firms operates at home while it decreases
the wage gap when numerous firms competes at home.
4 An empirical investigation
The theoretical model determines the ability to discriminate in imperfectly competitive
sectors that are opened to trade. The empirical challenge is thus to measure the degree of
both domestic competition and trade openness. To explore the effects of these variables
on gender wage discrimination, the empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. In section
4.1, we estimate gender wage discrimination using individual data. Section 4.2 presents
the competition variables. Section 4.3 explains how market access are computed. The last
step, described in section4.4, consists of regressing the wage gap due to discrimination on
the domestic competition indicator and the market access variables to test the theoretical
implications.
We conduct the empirical exercise on data from Uruguay, a country that witnessed an
important liberalization episode in the 1990s. Several liberalization agreements took place,
at the regional level with the Mercosur founded in 1991 and amended in December 1994
and also with the multilateral negotiations driven by the GATT and WTO. This period
contrasted with previous decades during which sectors were protected by tariffs. Uruguay
is a small open economy with export and import shares on the increase, as figure 1 shows.
Besides its comparative advantage in sectors using intensively natural resources such as
food processing industries, the population of Uruguay is relatively educated so that we can
expect the country to be able to compete internationally in modern manufacturing sectors
as well.
4.1 Computing gender wage gaps
4.1.1 Uruguayan Household Survey
We use the longitudinal Uruguayan household survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares
ECH) over the period that ranges from 1983 to 2003. The survey provides data on gross
hourly wages, occupation, education, age, sector of activity (at a level of disaggregation
between one and two digit). Unfortunately variables on unemployment duration and job
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tenure are missing for many years which impedes us from deriving real experience on the
labour market. Other individual variables allow to estimate selection into labour market
(marital status, husband’s income, number of children...).
Table 1 indicates that labour market participation is much lower for women than for
men. Around 49% of the female working-age population was active in 1990 while almost
60% of women participated to the labour market at the end of the period. If the partici-
pation gap decreased steadily over the period, the unemployment gap however increased.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the household survey
Gender 1990 1995 2000 2004
Observations Male 19128 20217 18057 17233
Female 22403 23156 20522 19577
Participation rate Male 81.3 83.6 82.1 81
Female 48.8 54.9 58.7 59.2
Unemployment rate Male 4.5 7.6 10.7 10.1
Female 7.1 13 16.9 16.5
Among employees in the Male 2595 2185 1533 1385
manufacturing industry Female 1225 941 706 637
Mean age Male 36.5 36 35.8 37
Female 35.6 35.8 36 36.5
Primary Education Male 40 59 55 27.7
Female 38 58 51 22.5
Secondary Education Male 33 12 15.7 39.1
Female 44 19 24.1 48
Technical Male 21 22 21.8 24.2
Female 10 13 10.4 14.8
College Education Male 5 7 6.8 5.3
Female 8 10 14.1 10.7
Based on the Household survey, ECH, INE, Uruguay.
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4.1.2 Empirical methodology: decomposition of the sectoral raw wage gaps
To obtain a measure of discrimination, we retrieve, as finely as possible, the part of
the wage gap due to differences in treatment of identical productive characteristics such as
educational attainment. Indeed, if the endowment in human capital of women happened to
be higher, for example, in export oriented sectors compared to import competing sectors,
correlations would indicate that export success contributes to the narrowing of the gender
wage gap but this would not have anything to do with the mechanism at work in the model.
We restrain the sample to employees aged from 18 to 65, hence excluding employers,
unpaid workers and self-employed. The individual characteristics taken into account in this
analysis are: the level of education (5 categories), potential experience (age minus 6 minus
the number of education years) and potential experience squared. A dummy equal to one if
the individual lives in Montevideo controls for wage disparities across the urban center and
the rest of the country which is far less urbanized. Estimating the wage gap on employees
of the private sector only do not change the results. Besides, one can makes arguments for
including or for excluding the occupational controls. Here we consider that human capi-
tal characteristics should determine the job position hence we do not control for positions10.
We estimate the male and female wage equations separately for each sector and year
so that the returns to human capital characteristics are allowed to vary across sectors and
years. For each year t and sector j, we run the two following wage equations:
lnWmjt = β0mjt + βmjtXmjt + mjt
lnWfjt = β0fjt + βfjtXfjt + mjt
Following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), the total wage difference can be decom-
posed into three terms:
lnWmj − lnW fj = β0mj − β0fj +Xfj(βmj − βfj) + (Xmj −Xfj)βmj (10)
10Strikingly enough, controlling for job occupations increases the unexplained part of the wage gap at the
beginning of the period in the following industries: food, machinery, paper and printing and chemical. This
result is due to bigger discrepancies in the return to education within occupation compare to the average
differences in return when we do not control for occupation.
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The first term captures differences in average starting wage. The second one represents
differences in returns to similar characteristics. The third term represents the explained
component, due to average differences in productivity determinants (such as education or
experience) of workers; it is “the endowments effect”. The sum of the two first terms is
referred to as the adjusted wage gap that we will use subsequently in the analysis.
WGj = β0mj − β0fj +Xfj(βmj − βfj)
Table 2: Decomposition of the raw wage gap. Manufacturing industry
Year 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 2001 2003
Raw Wage Gap 0.31 0.41 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.22
lnW¯m − lnW¯f (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Gap due to 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
endowments (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.1) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Gap due to 0.26 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.34 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.25
returns (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Number of men 1383 2857 1863 2383 2326 2164 1975 1632 1425 1216
Number of women 666 1308 857 1261 1139 932 854 701 693 577
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Encuesta Continua de Hogares, INE, Uruguay. Manufacturing employees only.
Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition of the raw wage gap. Wages include bonuses.
Table 2 presents the results of the decomposition for half of the years included in the
sample. For the sake of space, we just present the decomposition of the raw wage gap
for the whole manufacturing industry here. We can see that both the average raw and
adjusted wage gap in the manufacturing sectors dropped in the early 1990s when the Mer-
cosur was first introduced; they further decreased in the mid 1990S which corresponds to
a consolidation of the trade agreement. The Uruguayan banking and currency crisis in the
early 2000s can be responsible of the rise in the wage gaps during that period. The decom-
position shows that differences in human capital endowments between men and women do
not contribute to the positive raw wage gap ; indeed, women have a relatively high level
of education, even higher than men in some fields as shown in table 1. The decomposition
highlights that the human capital endowments are on average much less remunerated for
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women.
Table 3: Employment and Wage Gaps between Men and Women
1983-1990 1991-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Whole economy Participation gap 35 30 26 22
Female share 40 41 44 47
Raw wage Gap 29 18 9 3
Wage Gap 22 24 19 10
Industry Employement share 22 21 16 13
Female share 21 33 30 32
Raw wage Gap 57 43 29 26.8
Wage Gap 39 38 29 27
Textile Employment share 6.4 5.7 3.3 2.8
Apparel Female share 57.9 60.6 57.5 57.5
Raw Wage Gap 102 78 64 64
Wage Gap 60 59 56 53
Food Employment share 7.3 6.9 6.1 5.2
Tobacco Female share 22.3 26.5 27.4 30.4
Raw Wage Gap 46 31 30 28
Wage Gap 27 26 26 25
Chemical Employment share 2.5 2.4 2 1.9
products Female share 25.8 28.4 40 33.4
Oil Raw Wage Gap 5 16 12 18
Wage Gap 27 23 20 18
Paper Employment share 1.3 1.3 1.1 1
Printing Female share 27.1 26.5 28.5 33.4
Raw Wage Gap 35 28 12 18
Wage Gap 28 27 24 27
Machines Employment share 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.4
Female share 11.6 11.7 11.4 14.1
Raw Wage Gap 1 -4 3 -4
Wage Gap 11 9 7 0
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Encuesta Continua de Hogares, INE, Uruguay.
Variables are in percentage.
Note that for the wage gaps used in the empirical analysis are estimated for each
manufacturing industry separately to build a panel of sectors from 1983 to 2003. This
approach thus allows for heterogeneous returns to characteristics across industries and
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years. The raw and adjusted wage gaps for the different manufacturing sectors are displayed
in table 3along with gaps in employment shares.
Overall, raw wage gaps and wage discrimination have been falling since the beginning
of the 1980s. The wage differentials between men and women due to differences in return
ranges from 22% to 10% in the whole economy11 but Both the raw wage gaps and the wage
gaps are substantially wider in the manufacturing industries12. The adjusted wage gap is
much higher in the manufacturing industry where it ranges from 40% to 27%.
At the beginning of the period male wages used to be more than the double of female
wages and 40% of the gap remained unexplained; during the first half of the years 2000, the
raw wage gap was around 27% and could not be explained by observable characteristics.
Within the manufacturing industry, there are wide differences in wage gaps across sectors.
The food, beverage and tobacco and the textile and apparel industries are the ones that
employ more women. In both industries the raw and the unjustified wage gaps have de-
creased but have remained high, especially in the textile and apparel industry where more
the half of the raw wage gap was due to differences in returns in the early 2000s.
4.2 Measure of domestic competition, Herfindahl index
A large literature deals with the measure of market power at the industry level. The
four-firm concentration ratio or the Herfindahl index of concentration are commonly cho-
sen proxies to capture the level of industry competition. For the present analysis, Herfind-
ahl indexes have been computed based on a confidential firm survey. It is computed as
HH = ∑Ni s2i , HHi = ∑Ne s2ei where sei is firm e’s share of production in industry i. It
ranges from 1, a monopolistic situation, to 1N if firms have equal market shares. Table
4 presents summary statistics of the sectoral concentration of market shares at the two
digit level. Even if the definition of industries is rather aggregated, the index displays wide
variations across sectors and time. The most concentrated sector in the early 80s was the
paper industry while in 2000, the food and beverage industry and the machinery industry
are the most concentrated sectors.
11Other studies using different methods find higher unexplained wage gaps. For example, Atal et al.
(2009) estimate the unexplained wage gap with a non-parametric matching approach ; they find that in
2005 around 20% of the gap remained unexplained.
12This paper focuses on the manufacturing industries, as they are the most subject to international trade.
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Table 4: Herfindahl index of production concentration among manufacturing industries
Year 1983-87 1990 1991 1994 1995 2000
Textile Apparel 18 22 23 28 27 15
Chemical 28 24 26 29 30 58
Machines 29 14 12 16 20 30
Food Beverage 33 22 25 29 28 49
Paper 39 32 30 41 43 32
Source: INE, Uruguay. Here HH = 100×
∑N
i
s2i .
4.3 Measures of foreign competition at home and in the foreign markets
4.3.1 Trade data
To construct measures of foreign competition, this article employs bilateral trade and
production data taken from the TradeProd database constructed by the CEPII. They cover
the period 1980-2003 for Uruguayan manufacturing sectors. A detailed description of the
database can be found in Mayer et al. (2008). This database has the particularity to match
trade flows and production levels at the industrial level which allows us to construct trade
shares and internal flows (exports minus production) easily. The CEPII provides also the
Distances database with bilateral distances and common official language which are used
to capture part of the trade costs.
4.3.2 Market access
In most of the papers dealing with the impact of trade openness on the gender wage
gap, foreign competition is captured by import penetration13. However, import penetration
alone might not be an appropriate measure. First, higher import penetration does not
necessarily squeeze profitability if export opportunities are high enough. Second, import
penetration can increase either because imports go up or because domestic production
goes down; in the latter case, a change in domestic market conditions will mislead us into
believing that foreign competition became sharper.
Some studies also regress the wage gap on export shares14 or on global openness (Xj+MjQj
where Mj is import volume, Xj the exports volume and Qj the level of production in
13See Artecona and Cunningham (2002), Berik et al. (2004), Black and Brainerd (2004), Menon and
van der Meulen Rodgers (2009)
14Berik et al. (2004), Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers (2009)
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industry j). Even if it is true that more competitive firms do better at exporting, it
does not necessarily mean that higher export shares reflect tougher competition pressure
on domestic firms. Export shares can also increase because trade liberalization makes it
cheaper, providing higher export revenues without heightening competition.
As for global openness, this variable does not allow to disentangle the impact of import
penetration from the impact of export orientation on wage gaps.
To partly remedy these issues, one should control for both import and export shares in
the same regression; moreover, it is important to test for the robustness of the results by
using other indicators of trade openness. We argue that market access is an appropirate
measure to capture the ability of foreign firms to sell their products in the domestic market
as well as the ability of domestic firms’ to sell abroad.
Since the 90s, the economic geography literature has emphasized how proximity to
markets with large demand shapes international trade patterns. In their seminal work,
Redding and Venables (2004) estimate structurally a model where access to markets and
sources of supply at the country level explain country variations in per capita income.
Recent studies by Fally et al. (2010) and Hering and Poncet (2010) estimate market access
at the sectoral level and look at its impact on variations in sectoral wages. We follow here
their approach.
We now define two variables. Market access (MA) captures the easiness for Uruguayan
firms to penetrate foreign markets (Uruguay’s exports). Competitors access to the Uruguayan
market (CA) captures the easiness for foreign firms to sell in Uruguay (Uruguay’s imports).
A high MA corresponds to a high potential demand addressed to Uruguayan firms
given their geographical position, their competitiveness and those of other exporters. MA
is thus positively related to firms’ potential profitability. In a setting with free entry and
no economic profit, an increase in MA leads to an entry of firms. In a sector with restricted
entry, an increase in MA raises the profit margin of exporters; this is the profit enhancing
effect of trade. To state this in a different manner, the maximum production cost that
firms can incur is increasing in their access to foreign markets.
However, profit opportunities abroad depends on the competition among all potential
exporters. The oligopolistic framework features firms with heterogeneous costs that operate
in the domestic market but might not be able to enter the foreign market. The high-cost
discriminatory firms are more likely to enter the foreign markets if they compete with few
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firms while entering the foreign market. As a result, an increase in MA enable high cost
firms to make profits from exports only if the level of concentration is high. If concentration
is low, only the low-cost firms will be able to enter the foreign market.
CA measures the ability of foreign producers to sell in the Uruguayan market given their
competitive advantage and the transport costs they have to incur to enter Uruguay. An
increase in CA increases the volume of foreign goods in the Uruguayan market and reduces
the price level through the competition channel. CA captures thus the pro-competitive
effect of trade. An increase in CA has a negative impact on the ability to pay some
workers a premium and this impact is stronger when the domestic market is concentrated.
To compute MA and CA we first estimate the impact of trade costs and sectors’ charac-
teristics on the volume of exports for all pairs of trade partners. We estimate the following
gravity equation:
lnXDFjt =
∑
kt
βkjtτk,DFjt + FXDjt + FMFjt + DFjt
where XDFjt is the volume of exports of good j from country D to country F during
year t. k is the number of variables that measure trade costs Characteristics of sector j in
region D such as the number of firms and the average cost of production are captured by
a fixed effect specific to each sector j-country D year t: FXDjt. Similarly, the importing
region fixed effect FMFjt captures market characteristics specific to each sector for a given
country and year such as the number of firms operating in sector j in year t and their
average competitiveness.
Trade costs to enter market F τk,DFjt are captured by a set of variables: bilateral dis-
tance, contiguity, common language, regional trade agreement. Tariffs cannot be included
because of too frequent missing values for Uruguay. We estimate the bilateral trade equa-
tion for each year and industry so that the impact of trade costs β vary across sectors and
time for a given pair of trade partners.
The access of Uruguayan firms selling good j to all foreign markets in year t is denoted
MAjt. It is the sum of the market access to specific countries F :
MAURY jt =
∑
F
MAURY,Fjt =
∑
F
(
FMFjt
∏
k
(τk,URY,Fjt)βkt
)
MAj increases when the trade costs τk,URY,Fjt fall.
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Foreign firms’ access to the Uruguyan access are computed as follows:
CAURY jt =
∑
F
MAF,URY jt =
∑
F
(
FXF,URY jt
∏
k
(τk,F,URY jt)βkt
)
CA increases when the trade costs to enter Uruguay fall, when the demand for good
j increases, when the number and productivity of Uruguayan firms producing good j
decrease.
Those two synthetic variables embeds the sectoral characteristics that determine the
wage gap. Besides being closer to the theory, market access has another advantage compare
to traditional outcome variable (trade shares). When looking at the impact of openness
on firms’ behaviour (here human resources policy), we want the openness variable to be
exogenous to firms’ decisions. We are in firmer ground with market access compare to
trade shares.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of CA and MA in the food processing industry and the
machines and equipment industry. Both MA and CA rose in the 1990s. Market access
drop sharply in the aftermath of the crisis that occurred in the early 2000s in the region
which makes sens as demand addressed to Uruguayan firms fell.
Figure 1: Market Access
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4.4 Empirical specification: market access as a determinant of the gender
wage gap
To identify empirically the pro and anti-competitive effect of trade openness, we need to
separate it out from the effect of domestic competition. Furthermore, the model underlines
that the impact of trade openness depends on the domestic market structure. Thus, we
interact the trade openness variables with the level of domestic competition captured by
the Herfindahl index. Hence we employ a strategy in line with a difference-in-differences
approach as we compare the effect of trade exposure (treatment) in competitive sectors
(the control group) and in imperfectly competitive sectors. As foreign competition can
impact the level of concentration in an industry by leading some inefficient firms to exit,
we interact the openness measure with the level of concentration prior the liberalization
episode Cj0 rather than the contemporaneous level of concentration.
WGjt = β0 + β1 lnMAjt + β2 lnCj0 lnMAjt + β3 lnCAjt + β4 lnCj0 lnCAjt + θt + µj + jt
(11)
whereMAjt captures profit opportunities in foreign market j at time t while CAjt cap-
tures foreign competition pressures due to the entry of foreign products, Cjt0 is the level of
concentration of sector j in the first period 0, θt is a time fixed effect and µj is an industry
fixed effect. The level of sectoral concentration in the first period Cj0 are controlled for by
the sector fixed effects.
Gender wage gap can vary across sectors because of sectoral features that have nothing
to do with competition pressures. To avoid any spurious correlation due to industry char-
acteristics, sector fixed effects are included. They net out the impact of time-invariant
industry-specific factors such as social norms regarding female labour (female work in ma-
chinery or oil industries may be less accepted than female work in textile and apparel).
They are of primordial importance as sectors relying more on male labour force might be
more male chauvinist, and could be, for some reasons, correlated with concentration or
trade orientation, so that omitting them would bias the estimates.
Year fixed effects capture shocks or policies that affect labour market conditions equally in
all manufacturing sectors. It includes macroeconomic shocks or government policies that
influence female labour supply (child care or parental leave reforms) for example.
Since we control for industry and time fixed effects, this specification identifies the impact
of trade openness through within-industry variation.
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Lagged effects of the explanatory variables are also estimated:
WGjt = β0+β1 lnMAjt−1+β2 lnCj0 lnMAjt−1+β3 lnCAjt−1+β4 lnCj0CAjt−1+θt+µj+jt
(12)
Some specification also controls for past concentration levels Cjt−1, which gives an
insight on whether women suffer more from discrimination when they work in sectors with
stronger domestic market power compare to sectors with little domestic market power. We
control also for the lagged share of women in the sector FLSjt−1 to deal with additional
determinants of the wage gap that are ignored in the theoretical model because of the fixed
labour supply assumption.
Turning to the expected signs of the coefficients, an increase in MA creates new oppor-
tunities for Uruguayan firms to make profits abroad and by doing so it strengthens their
ability to discriminate. This effect is expected to be significant in sectors where discrim-
inatory firms can compete with their domestic counterparts, i.e. in concentrated sectors
(β2 > 0). However, if there is a sufficiently high number of firms in the sector prior to
the liberalization period, only the most productive firms are expected to export. In that
case, we do not expect any widening of the wage gap. On the contrary, as most productive
non-discriminatory firms expand in the foreign markets, they put more pressure on the
labour demand which reduces the gender wage gap ( β1 < 0).
An increase in CA corresponds to more entries of foreign products which increases
competition pressures. We expect it to reduce discrimination only in concentrated sectors
where domestic competition is low enough to allow costly hiring decisions (β4 < 0). In
sectors atomized prior to the liberalization period (low Cj0), incentives to cut unit costs
are already very high, no costly discrimination can take place, hence the impact of trade
on discrimination, if there is one, does not play through the pro-competitive effect.
4.5 The results
Table 5 and 6 report the results obtained from regressing the gender wage gap on for-
eign competitors’ access to the Uruguayan market CA as a measure of foreign competition
and Uruguayan firms access to foreign markets MA as a measure of profit opportunities.
Columns (1) to (4) of each table report the results of estimating equation (11) using con-
temporaneous market access while columns (5) to (8) report the results of estimating the
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equation (12) using the lagged explanatory variables. In order to account for some sectors’
time varying characteristics that might be correlated with the gender wage gap, we control
for the concentration level lnC and the female labour share lnFLS in columns (4) and (8).
Table 5: Market Access on the Wage Gap. Mercosur trade partners
Dependant variable Unexplained Gender wage gap
Explanatory Contemporaneous Lagged
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnCA 0.483* 0.550*** 0.496** 0.511* 0.552** 0.662***
(0.183) (0.099) (0.153) (0.205) (0.121) (0.090)
lnCA×lnC0 -0.135* -0.149*** -0.137** -0.144* -0.156** -0.187***
(0.052) (0.030) (0.047) (0.058) (0.035) (0.025)
lnMA -0.443** -0.409* -0.415* -0.697* -0.699** -0.652*
(0.158) (0.165) (0.180) (0.292) (0.242) (0.260)
lnMA×lnC0 0.125** 0.106* 0.110* 0.204* 0.200** 0.186*
(0.041) (0.048) (0.045) (0.080) (0.064) (0.070)
lnCt−1 0.102* 0.011
(0.044) (0.050)
lnFLS 0.016 -0.121*
(0.046) (0.047)
Constant 0.573** 0.115 0.256 -0.109 0.335 0.089 0.132 0.072
(0.133) (0.306) (0.309) (0.336) (0.158) (0.188) (0.265) (0.426)
Observations 98 98 98 98 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.352 0.343 0.392 0.420 0.345 0.365 0.399 0.418
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include fixed effects for the five sectors.
C is the average value of the Herfindahl index between 1983 and 1987.
In Table 5, CA and MA are computed for Mercosur countries only, namely Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In columns (1),(2), (5) and (6) the wage gap is explained
by either CA or MA. Yet, all sectors feature two-way trade; with the Mercosur, firms
within the same sector enjoyed new market opportunities and in the same time, had to
cope with new entries of products from their trade partners. As the two dimensions have
opposite effects on the ability to discriminate, it is worth controlling for the two variables
in the same regression.
32
The effect of foreign competition lnCA is stable and significant. It comes out that
foreign competition is associated with an increase in the unexplained wage gap in non-
concentrated sectors, as the positive coefficient on lnCA indicates. This point estimate
gives the impact of competitors access for sectors with an initial Herfindahl index equals to
zero, that is to say for sectors with a very large number of firms, which does not correspond
to the oligopolistic framework developed in the model. The model developed in section
2 cannot explain why a surge in the entry of foreign goods is positively correlated with
the wage gap in sectors with a large number of firms. A similar results is found by Black
and Brainerd (2004) when they regress the gender wage gap on import penetration. They
suggest that this can be due to a second effect of trade, namely the increase in demand for
skills. Yet, we should bear in mind that differences in observable skills are controlled for in
the first stage of both studies so that a rise in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers fostered by trade is not what drives this result. An unequal access to high-skilled
positions or an increase in returns of skills that are not observable by the econometrician
such as tenure or vocational training are potential relevant explanations.
That being said, the principal coefficient of interest with regard to the taste discrim-
ination framework is the interaction of foreign competition with the concentration level,
considered as a proxy of market power. The robust negative sign associated with the inter-
action lnCA×lnC0 shows that among concentrated sectors, the wage gap is lower in sectors
where firms face new competitive forces due to an easier entry of foreign products. This
effect can be interpreted as the consequence of the reduction in market power that was
previously used by employers to discriminate against women.
The MA variable measures Uruguayan firms’ access to foreign market, or export po-
tentials. First, the negative and significant coefficients on lnMA revels that in markets
with low market power, the ability to enter foreign markets does not translate into increas-
ing ability to discriminate. This is in line with the model prediction: for a high enough
number of firms, only the most productive no discriminatory firms exports. Moreover, the
expansion of those firms make it harder for the discriminatory firms to break even in their
own domestic market, which explains the reduction in the wage gap. This is what we refer
to as the “intensive margin effect” of trade partners’ liberalization.
Secondly, the positive and significant coefficients on lnMA × lnC0 makes out that, when
the sector is highly concentrated, higher sales opportunities abroad correspond to higher
unexplained wage gap. This is a situation where the “extensive margin effect” dominates,
that is to say when less productive discriminatory firms are able to enter foreign markets
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and gain profit margins abroad.
Table 6 reports the effect of competitors’ access to the Uruguayan markets CA and
Uruguayan sectors’ access to foreign markets lnMA when we consider all the trade partners
of Uruguay. Results are similar to those obtain with the previous definition of market
access, the estimated coefficients are stable and significant except for the contemporaneous
impact of MA that is insignificant.
Table 6: Market Access on the Wage Gap. All trade partners
Dependant variable Unexplained Gender wage gap
Explanatory variables Contemporaneous Lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnCA 0.473 0.582** 0.512** 0.536 0.635** 0.745***
(0.249) (0.136) (0.116) (0.284) (0.149) (0.141)
lnCA×lnC0 -0.132 -0.157** -0.140** -0.151 -0.179** -0.211***
(0.070) (0.038) (0.036) (0.081) (0.043) (0.041)
lnMA -0.443* -0.470* -0.458 -0.710* -0.769* -0.726*
(0.192) (0.213) (0.246) (0.320) (0.284) (0.306)
lnMA×lnC0 0.126* 0.123 0.122 0.207* 0.220** 0.207*
(0.051) (0.060) (0.064) (0.088) (0.077) (0.083)
lnCt−1 0.099* 0.008
(0.043) (0.052)
lnFLS 0.022 -0.119*
(0.043) (0.046)
Constant 0.590** 0.152 0.284 -0.074 0.338 0.105 0.146 0.097
(0.156) (0.295) (0.305) (0.321) (0.181) (0.183) (0.269) (0.433)
Observations 98 98 98 98 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.349 0.338 0.387 0.414 0.343 0.358 0.395 0.413
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include fixed effects for the five sectors.
The last four columns show the impact of both lnCAt−1 and lnMAt−1. The impact
of CA, lagged by one period, is of the same sign but of larger magnitude than the con-
temporaneous impact. The impact of MA is now significant and corroborates the model
predictions on the unequivocal effect of trade partners’ liberalization. An improvement in
export opportunities across all destination markets does not contribute to wage disparities
across employees in competitive sectors but it does in concentrated sectors.
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5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of wage discrimination with intra-industry trade to high-
light the possible channels through which trade openness impacts the wage gap that arises
because of employers’ prejudices against women. As far as we know, it is the first explicit
model where both the wage gap and the trade pattern are endogenously determined. The
model formalizes the intuitive pro-competitive effect of trade on the wage gap. What is
more, it puts new light on a profit enhancing effect of openness , by doing so it explains
otherwise puzzling results.
Trade openness has heterogenous effects on the ability to discriminate. First, trade
liberalization of the domestic economy makes it easier for foreign firms to penetrate the
market which corresponds to tougher foreign competition at home. It drives down oligopoly
profits, reduces the production of high-cost discriminatory firms and can even oblige them
to cease production. This selection of firms puts a downward pressure on the gender wage
gap.
Second, the liberalization of trade partners’ markets have counteracting effects. It en-
ables less productive firms to enter foreign markets by reducing the cost of exporting which
boosts their rents instead of exerting a pro-competitive effect. This channel dominates only
if the competition at home is not too fierce. To say it differently, freer trade makes it easier
for prejudiced employers to employ and pay workers according to their preferences if they
can sustain their cost disadvantage compare to their domestic and foreign competitors.
However, if discriminatory firms are able to sustain their cost disadvantage at home but
not abroad, better export opportunities benefit only the most productive domestic firms
that expand abroad, increase their demand for female labour which thus reduces the wage
gap. This effect dominates when the number of firms is high enough.
To provide some empirical evidence of these mechanisms, we take advantage of the
sharp liberalization episode that took place in Uruguayan following the creation of the
Mercosur in 1991 and its consolidation in 1995. We estimate market access variables to
give a measure of the pattern of competitive advantage between trade partners, which is
closer to the theory than the trade output variables used so far. Uruguay is an interesting
country to explore the impacts of market access as it is a small economy that is less likely
to influence the outcomes of trade agreement negotiations. This ensures the exogeneity of
changes in trade policies with respect to domestic industries characteristics.
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The main theoretical predictions are supported by the empirical findings. Foreign
competition curbs the adjusted wage gap in sectors previously sheltered from competition.
On the contrary, profit opportunities from export increase the adjusted wage gap when
domestic concentration is high but not when concentration is low. However, if competition
can reduce the unexplained wage gap, it does not suppress it completely. In particular, the
remaining wage gap in rather competitive sectors is positively affected by an increase in
foreign firms’ access to the domestic market. This empirical result remains a puzzle and
calls for further investigations.
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Appendix
A Conditions for an interior solutions for firms’ production
levels
The production level of firm i given by its reaction function depends on its own cost,
the number and average cost of its competitors and the size of demand:
qi =
b− ci + (N − 1)(c˜−i − ci)
N + 1
Firms employing men have the highest unit cost and thus the lowest production level.
They are the first to cease production if competition pressures heighten. In what follows,
we derive the conditions to have an interior solution for discriminatory firms’ production.
As non-discriminatory firms have lower cost, they necessarily produce if discriminatory
firms produce. In the case where no high-cost firm can survive, there is no wage gap and
I derive the condition for N identical firms incurring a unit labour cost.
A.1 The closed Economy Case
Discriminatory firms pay a wage wf + d∗ to their male employees ; they produce a
positive amount qm if :
qm > 0⇔ b > wf + d∗ +
(
d∗
d¯
(N − 1) + 1
)
d∗
2
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where d∗
d¯
(N − 1) + 1 = Nf . High wage gaps are sustainable in markets with large
enough demand. In markets with numerous firms, the critical demand level below which
wage gaps cannot exist need to be higher.
If Nf ≤ NmN−1 , then all women are hired by the non prejudiced employers so that there
are no cost differences between male-firms and the female firm, wf = wm = w. All firms
produce the same amount q = b−wN+1 and an interior solution requires that demand be large
enough:
q > 0⇔ b > w
A.2 The Open Economy Case
In the open economy setting, domestic firms can either produce locally and export to
foreign markets, produce only for the domestic market or cease production all together.
This separation of markets requires to examine four conditions.
Positive Wage Gap. Discriminatory and Non-discriminatory firms.
Are discriminatory firms able to export?
qmDF > 0⇔ bF > wfτF (NF + 1) + d∗τF (NF + 1 + Nf2 )− cFNF
It is always the case that qmDF > 0 if cF > τF (wf+d∗)+S with S = τFNF (wf+d
∗(1+Nf2 ))
That is to say, qmDF > 0 if discriminatory domestic firms have a strong competitive ad-
vantage. τF (wf +d∗) represents the production cost to export and S take into account the
cost disadvantage generated by discrimination. Indeed, discriminatory firms need to com-
pensate for their higher cost with respect to non-discriminatory domestic firms exporting
in the foreign market.
If discriminatory firms do not have a competitive advantage, then it is necessary for them
that few foreign firms NF operate in the destination market F . If τF (wf + d∗) + S > cF
then qmDF > 0 if NF <
bF−τF (wf+d∗(1+
Nf
2 ))
τF (wf+d∗)−cF
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Are non-discriminatory domestic firms able to export?
If discriminatory firms are not competitive enough and foreign firms NF are too nu-
merous, they do not export and we need to look whether non-discriminatory firms are able
to enter the foreign market. Non-discriminatory firms employ women but can be prej-
udice against women; this situation takes place whenever the discrepancy between male
and female wages compensate employers’ discomfort of hiring women. Thus, the following
condition depends on the prejudice of each specific firm. For every firm i with di < d∗:
qiDF > 0⇔ bF > (NF + 1)(τF (wf + di)) + τFd∗(ND − Nf2 )−NF cF
If cF > τF (w + di) + Si it is always true, with Si = τFNF (wf + di − d∗(ND +
Nf
2 ))
The rationale behind the condition remains the same: higher demand bF in market F
makes it easier for domestic firms to export; the cost advantage of domestic firm need
to compensate for the transport cost and for the impact of their prejudice di. Note that
having positive exports is less demanding for less prejudiced firms as they perceive that
they bear labour costs and are ready to hire more women: Si decreases with di.
If cF < τF (w + di) + Si , then qiDF > 0⇔ NF < bF−τF (w+di)+d
∗(ND+
Nf
2 )
τF (w+di)−cF
A lower number of competitors compensate for the absence of strong competitive advan-
tage over foreign firms.
Are discriminatory firms able to sell on the domestic market?
qmDD > 0⇔ b > wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 )− τDcFNF
if wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 ) < τDcFNF it is always the case qmDD > 0 .
However, if discriminatory domestic firms have not a competitive advantage, then it is
necessary for them that there are few foreign firms willing to sell in the domestic market:
if wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 ) > τDcFNF then qmDD > 0⇔ NF <
b−wf−d∗(1+
Nf
2 )
wf+d∗−τDcF
No wage gap. The Homogeneous Firms Case
Are domestic firms able to export?
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If there is no cost differences between m-type firms and f-type firms , wf = wm = w, then
qDF = bF−τFw+NF (cF−τFw)N+1 and:
qDF > 0⇔ bF > τFw −NF (cF − τFw)
If cF > τFw it is always true. If cF > τFw, then qDF > 0⇔ NF < bF−τFwτFw−cF
A higher demand in market F makes it easier for domestic firms to export. On the
other side, a higher number of foreign competitors make it harder.
Are domestic firms able to sell on their market?
If there is no cost differences between m-type firms and f-type firms , wf = wm = w, then
qDD = b−w+NF (τDcF−w)N+1 and:
qDD > 0⇔ b > τFw −NF (τDcF − w)
If τDcF > w it is always true. If cF > w, then qDD > 0⇔ NF < b−ww−τDcF .
B Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the wage gap d∗
The wage gap d∗ is defined by d = F (d). To make sure this equation has a solution,
we need to define under which conditions the function F cross the 45◦ line.
As F is decreasing in d (F ′(d) < 0), we thus have to show that F (0) > 0 and F (d¯) < d¯.
F (0) = 2(Lf − Lm(N−1)) > 0 if Lf > LmN−1
F (d¯) < 0 so that F (d¯) < d¯
Moreover F is strictly decreasing as F ′(d) < 0, it implies that F (d) cross only once the
45ï¿12 line. Thus d∗ is unique.
To sum up, d = F (d) has a unique solution if Lf > LmN−1 which requires that the female
labour force is not fully employed by one firm only (that would be the unprejudiced one).
If Lf ≤ LmN−1 there is no equilibrium wage gap in this model.
C Descriptive Statistics
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Table 7: Summary Statistics: Trade Patterns of Manufacturing Industries
Indicator Period Net trade Import penetration Export share Openness
Industry 83-90 19 8 13 21
91-94 -6 15 13 26
95-99 -14 19 15 31
00-04 -7 22 19 35
Food 83-90 78 1 11 12
Beverage 91-94 66 2 10 12
Tobacco 95-99 54 5 14 18
00-04 50 6 17 18
83-90 84 2 27 29
Textile 91-94 60 7 28 34
Apparel 95-99 49 12 33 43
00-04 44 15 40 52
83-90 -28 40 38 57
Machines 91-94 -59 70 19 56
95-99 -72 130 23 71
00-04 -62 220 52 89
83-90 -51 10 4 13
Chemical 91-94 -52 25 7 26
Oil 95-99 -50 22 7 25
00-04 -44 24 9 28
83-90 -40 7 3 9
Paper 91-94 -40 10 4 12
Printing 95-99 -38 16 7 21
00-04 -33 37 20 44
Source: Own computations based on the TradeProd Database, CEPII.
Net trade equals X−M
X+M ; import penetration is
M
Q
and openness is X
Q
+ (1− X
Q
) M
Q+M−X .
Table 8: Summary Statistics: Evolution of Market Access and Competitiors’ Acess between
1983-90 and 1991-2003
Benchmark estimation With Regional trade agreement in trade costs
∆lMA ∆lCA ∆lMA ∆lCA
Textile Apparel -9 -81 59 -10
Chemical 86 44 130 85
Machines 97 71 195 141
Food Beverage 71 -37 79 -31
Paper 35 53 145 147
Source: Own computations based on the TradeProd Database from the CEPII.
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Table 9: Table of Correlations
wage gap lnMA lnCA lnHerf lnFLS
wage gap 1
lnMA -0.36 1
lnCA 0.56 0.04 1
lnHerf -0.45 0.37 -0.39 1
lnFLS 0.73 -0.20 0.52 -0.51 1
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